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M
any U.S. ﬁrms include both commercial and nonbank ﬁnancial
units. For example, General Motors Corporation encompasses
not only units that manufacture automobiles but also those, such
as General Motors Acceptance Corporation, that gather funding and make
loans to individuals and businesses. Firms that handle both commercial and
ﬁnancial activities appear to reap signiﬁcant beneﬁts that create the appeal
of such combinations. One byproduct of a commercial ﬁrm’s activities may
be information about its customers’ﬁnancial situation. The ﬁnancial afﬁliate
might then use this information to inexpensively target products to particular
customers, beneﬁting both the ﬁnancial ﬁrm and its customers.
While ﬁnance/commerce combinations are widespread, combinations be-
tweenbanksandcommercialﬁrmsaretypicallyprohibitedundervariousU.S.
laws. Banks are distinguished from other ﬁnancial ﬁrms by their ability to
gather funding by issuing government-insured deposits such as checking and
savings deposits. Despite prohibitions of banking/commerce combinations,
ﬁrms have managed to ﬁnd loopholes. Until recently the unitary thrift loop-
hole was a popular means of circumventing the banking/commerce wall. The
loophole allowed commercial companies to start or buy one, and only one,
thrift (i.e., a savings bank or savings and loan association, both of which is-
sue government-insured deposits), using the thrift as a conduit for providing
ﬁnancial services.
The unitary thrift loophole was closed in 1999, but another loophole re-
mains open. Federal banking law allows commercial ﬁrms to own industrial
loancorporations—essentiallybankswithsomewhatrestricteddeposit-taking
powers. (Foradditionaldiscussionoftheunitarythriftandindustrialloancor-
poration loopholes, see theAppendix.)
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Given the apparent beneﬁts of combinations, why prohibit or restrict
them? What hazards result from banking/commerce combinations? Tradi-
tionally, discussions of the threats focused on conﬂicts of interest and di-
minished competition. More recently, observers have been concerned that
combinations might increase deposit insurance claims and expand the uni-
verse of economic activities protected by the government safety net. As will
be discussed presently, the traditional concerns seem less relevant given the
level of competition banks face in today’s banking market. Over the last
twenty-ﬁve years, competition has expanded as restrictions were eliminated
on banks’ ability to operate across state lines and to offer market rates on
deposits. Also, new nonbank ﬁrms have arisen offering ﬁnancial products
competitive with most banking products. The concerns over increased de-
posit insurance claims and expansion of the safety net remain quite relevant.
Nevertheless, over the last decade a number of legislators have argued for
removal of the banking/commerce wall. I will analyze the threats and suggest
some restrictions that would be necessary if the wall were removed.
1. THE STATUTES FORMING THE WALL
The building blocks of the wall between banking and commerce are various
federal and state laws. The laws prevent banks from engaging in commer-
cial activities. They also prevent banks from owning subsidiary commercial
companies and from being owned by companies conducting commercial ac-
tivities. Speciﬁcally, the building blocks are the National Bank Act of 1864,
state banking laws, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement
Act of 1991, and the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956. (For a detailed
review of these statutes and their motivations see theAppendix.)
The National BankAct limits the powers of national banks and their sub-
sidiaries. National banks are those chartered and regulated by the U.S. Trea-
sury Department’s Ofﬁce of the Comptroller of the Currency. The Act states
that “a national banking association shall...havepowerto...exercise...all
such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of bank-
ing” (12 U.S.C. 24). While over the years the courts and the Comptroller
have wrangled over the meaning of the phrase “business of banking,” national
bankshavebeenallowedtoengageinbusinessessimilartotraditionalbanking
services but not other commercial activities. This restriction of powers ex-
tendsnotonlytoactivitiesofbanks, buttoactivitiesconductedbysubsidiaries
owned by banks.
State banking statutes typically set limits on the nonbank activities of
state banks and their subsidiaries, similar to the limits on national banks. Yet,
overtheyears, anumberofstateshaveauthorizedactivitieswellbeyondthose
allowednationalbanks,someofwhichtypicallywouldbeconsideredcommer-
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banks, and thereby the taxpayer-backed deposit insurance fund, led Congress
to restrict state legislatures’ ability to grant powers to state-chartered banks.
Speciﬁcally, under the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement
Act of 1991 (FDICIA), insured state-chartered banks are prohibited from en-
gaginginanyactivitiesimpermissiblefornationalbanksunlesstheFDICrules
that such activities pose no threat to the deposit insurance fund.
Those who advocate removing the banking/commerce wall typically do
notargueforallowingbankstoconductcommercialactivitiesorowncommer-
cial ﬁrms. Instead, they focus on allowing companies that own banks—that
is, bank holding companies—to own commercial companies, too. In other
words, they do not condone direct bank involvement in commerce but ﬁnd it
acceptableforbankholdingcompaniestoowncommercialcompanies, allow-
ing banks to afﬁliate with commercial companies.
The banking/commerce restrictions in the Bank Holding CompanyAct of
1956 were based on the view that “bank holding companies ought to conﬁne
their activities to the management and control of banks.” The Act restricted
bank holding companies such that they “would no longer be authorized to
manage or control nonbanking assets unrelated to the banking business” (U.S.
Code: Congressional and Administrative News [1956, 2482, 2484]).
To enforce this restriction, theAct deﬁnes a bank holding company as any
companythatownsabank.1 Itprohibitsbankholdingcompaniesfromengag-
ing in nonbanking activities. The Act allows an exception to the nonbanking
prohibition in cases in which the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System determines the nonbanking activity “to be so closely related to bank-
ing as to be a proper incident thereto” (12 U.S.C. 1843c). Typically the Board
deﬁnes activities closely related to banking as only those activities tradition-
ally performed by banks. Certain additional activities also have been allowed,
however, in cases in which they are tied to banking. For example, the Board
has determined that a bank holding company may own a data-processing ﬁrm
if it is primarily engaged in processing ﬁnancial, banking, or economic data
(Spong [2000, 156]).
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, enacted in 1999, added securities under-
writing and dealing, as well as insurance, to the list of activities in which
banks—throughbank-ownedsubsidiaries—andbankholdingcompaniescould
engage. Those bank holding companies choosing to engage in securities or
insurance activities are called ﬁnancial holding companies. The Act also ex-
panded the activities of bank-owning companies to include most ﬁnancial
activities, those determined by the Board and the Treasury Department to be
“ﬁnancial in nature,” “incidental to a ﬁnancial activity,” or “complementary to
1 The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 applied only to companies owning two or more
banks. Amendments enacted in 1970 extended the Act’s provisions to single-bank holding com-
panies.10 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
a ﬁnancial activity.” Nonetheless, while authorizing a wide range of ﬁnancial
activities, theAct leaves in place the wall between banking and commerce.
Decidingwhetheranactivityiscommercialinsteadofbankingorﬁnancial
and whether it can be conducted by a banking company is often not simple.
The decision was difﬁcult under the old Bank Holding CompanyAct standard
of being closely related and remains so under the new standard of being
ﬁnancial in nature, incidental to a ﬁnancial activity, or complementary to a
ﬁnancial activity. The placement of an activity on one side or the other of the
banking/commerce wall can be controversial and contentious. For example,
in December 2000 the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
and the Secretary of the Treasury jointly released for comments a proposal to
permit bank subsidiaries and ﬁnancial holding companies to engage in real
estate brokerage and management. Real estate industry trade groups quickly
objected to the proposal, arguing that it would amount to an illegal mixture of
bankingandcommerce. Bankingtradegroupsarguedinfavoroftheproposal.
Beyondtherealestateindustry’sobjections,legislatorsintroducedbillsinboth
the U.S. House of Representatives and the Senate to prohibit these real estate
activities in ﬁnancial holding companies. In April 2002 the Secretary of the
Treasury announced plans to put off a decision on the proposal until 2003.
2. RATIONALES FOR THE WALL
Three reasons are typically cited for maintaining a wall that prohibits bank-
ing/commerce combinations: conﬂicts of interest, monopoly power, and risk
tothetaxpayer-backeddepositinsurancefund.2 Thesethreejustiﬁcationswill
be examined below. As it turns out, because banking markets appear fairly
competitive, the ﬁrst two seem of relatively minor import. The third remains
quite signiﬁcant.
Conﬂicts of Interest
Observers have at times raised concerns over conﬂicts of interest that might
arise if banks and commercial ﬁrms are owned by the same ﬁrm. They argue
that such concerns justify keeping banking and commerce separate. Three
conﬂicts have been described. First, a bank afﬁliated with a commercial ﬁrm
would tend to deny loans to the afﬁliate’s competitors. Second, a bank might
use access to insured deposits to provide below-market-rate funding to its
afﬁliates while charging higher interest rates to unafﬁliated borrowers. Third,
in the legislative history of the Bank Holding CompanyAct, legislators noted
2 For discussions of these three reasons for maintaining the wall, see Krainer (2000, 21–23);
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that a bank with a commercial afﬁliate might deny loans to individuals who
do not purchase goods from the afﬁliate.
It seems natural that removing the banking/commerce wall would allow
the ﬁrst conﬂict to arise, since a bank with a commercial afﬁliate, say a restau-
rant, would not wish to provide funding to competing restaurants. Helping
the competitor would tend to lower the proﬁts of the afﬁliated restaurant. Yet,
if competition is reasonably strong, denying loans to competitors only low-
ers overall proﬁts of the consolidated banking/restaurant ﬁrm. If there are
alternative lenders over which the afﬁliated bank has no price advantage, the
competing restaurant would get a loan anyway and at the same interest rate
the afﬁliated bank would offer. So, by failing to make the loan, the bank loses
any proﬁt it might have made on that loan, hurting the bank. Yet the afﬁliated
restaurant suffers a loss in proﬁts regardless.3 Therefore, if competition is
strong, this potential conﬂict of interest is unlikely to present a problem and
cannot justify maintaining the banking/commerce wall.
But is banking competition strong? Since the 1970s, restrictions on bank-
versus-bank competition have been greatly reduced. Restrictions on banks’
abilitytocompetefordepositsoutsideoftheirlocalmarkets,oratleastoutside
of their home states, were severe before the late 1970s. While these restric-
tions did not apply to bank lending, banks generate a good bit of their lending
in the same markets in which they gather loans. Consequently, these restric-
tions likely limited loan competition as well. Banks’ability to open branches
statewide was greatly enhanced in the 1980s as many states removed branch-
ing restrictions. Restrictions on operating across state lines began to fall in
the mid-1980s and were almost completely removed by the Riegle-Neal In-
terstate BankingAct of 1994. As a result, banks that had been protected from
competition because of branching restrictions became subject to competitive
pressure from nonlocal banks by the mid-1980s.
Whiletheeliminationofbranchingrestrictionsopenedlocalbankingmar-
ketstogreatercompetition,othermarketandtechnologicaldevelopmentshave
expanded competition further. Consequently, if a bank denies a loan to a busi-
ness ﬁrm because it competes with the bank’s afﬁliate, that ﬁrm can ﬁnd
numerous alternative sources of funding in today’s more competitive loan
markets.
Competition among those who would lend to business borrowers has ex-
panded along several dimensions. For large business borrowers, banks faced
growing competition from the debt markets as commercial paper and bond
issues increased signiﬁcantly relative to bank lending over the last twenty-
ﬁve years. While small businesses cannot issue commercial paper or bonds,
today’s small businesses have access to loans from a wide range of lenders.
3 Owens (1994) makes this argument for bank lending in real estate.12 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
The largest banks aggressively court small business borrowers throughout the
countryviatheirWebsitesandtoll-freephonelines. Further, smallbusinesses
enjoyarangeofchoicesofnonbanklenders, includingﬁnancecompaniesand
leasing companies. Clearly, today’s borrowers, both large and small, have a
plethora of borrowing opportunities because of the competitive loan market.
If, in spite of these factors, some banking markets remain uncompetitive,
policymakers can address the problem directly by removing any remaining
barriers to entry. Alternatively, they might tackle monopoly power through
antitrust enforcement. Maintaining a wall that separates banking and com-
merce at best addresses a symptom of an uncompetitive market rather than the
lack of competition itself.
Still, using the restaurant example, one might argue that the bank with an
afﬁliated restaurant may for some reason have a cost advantage over its bank
competitors that lack such an afﬁliation. One reason for a cost advantage is
that the bank acquires information about the restaurant business through its
afﬁliation. While prohibiting afﬁliations might eliminate the advantage this
bank (and its afﬁliates) has over competitors, the restriction would diminish
economic efﬁciency because the least costly and most efﬁcient means of pro-
ducing banking services—through restaurant afﬁliation—would be denied.
Additionally, if bank/restaurant afﬁliations are allowed, banks that lack a
restaurant afﬁliate can simply overcome the cost disadvantage by afﬁliating.
This is just what the banking industry did when banks established branches
in grocery and discount stores, though they did it through leasing agreements
rather than afﬁliation. After perceiving the advantage gained by the inno-
vative bank that ﬁrst placed branches in such stores, other banks followed
suit to achieve the same advantage. Soon the advantage was dissipated by
competition.
Aside from the situation whereby a bank might deny loans to its afﬁliate’s
competitors, some observers note a second conﬂict of interest. They argue
that banks may have access to inexpensive funding because of underpriced
deposit insurance, and that this funding might be granted to banks’ afﬁliates
but not to other borrowers. Such funding would give afﬁliates an advantage
over ﬁrms not so afﬁliated.4 As long as the banking market is competitive,
however, every ﬁrm that borrows from a bank gets equivalent access to low-
costfundingwhetherafﬁliatedwithabankornot. Accessisequivalentbecause
abankonlyhurtsitself(i.e.,lowersitsrevenues)bynotlendingtoitsafﬁliate’s
competitors on equivalent terms to those offered its afﬁliate. If the bank with
an afﬁliate does not lend to its afﬁliate’s competitors, other banks would take
those customers and proﬁt from doing so. Further, Section 23A of the Federal
Reserve Act, applicable to all banks, restricts the amount of such afﬁliate
4 For discussions of the argument that access to bank funding could give bank afﬁliates an
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funding to at most 10 percent of the bank’s capital. Section 23B of the Act
requires such funding be on market terms.
In the legislative history of the Bank Holding CompanyAct, members of
Congress describe a third possible conﬂict of interest. Speciﬁcally, they argue
that a bank with a commercial afﬁliate might deny loans to individuals who
do not purchase goods from the afﬁliate. The Senate Banking Committee’s
report that analyzes the features of the bill that later became the Bank Holding
CompanyAct describes the concern as follows:
The committee was informed of the danger to a bank within a bank holding
company controlling nonbanking assets, should the company unduly favor
its nonbanking operations by requiring the bank’s customers to make use
of such nonbanking enterprises as a condition to doing business with
the bank. The bill’s divestment provisions should prevent this fear from
becoming a reality. (U.S. Code: Congressional and Administrative News
[1956, 2486], as cited in Halpert [1988, 500])
Tying a loan (or other service) to the purchase of another product can
only beneﬁt a bank if the bank has monopoly power in its loan market. If
it faces competition, denying loans to individuals who are not its afﬁliate’s
customers only hurts the bank, and so would not be undertaken. The bank is
hurt because it forfeits revenues and helps its bank competitors who would
make the loans (Owens [1994]). As noted earlier, when the Bank Holding
Company Act was passed in 1956, banking markets were heavily regulated.
Entry was restricted and prices were controlled. Monopoly power may have
been signiﬁcant, but most such restrictions have been removed. Additionally,
even if banks maintain monopoly power in credit markets, the commercial
afﬁliate must also have market power in order for tying to make consumers
worse off. In the case in which the combined ﬁrm has market power in
the banking and commercial markets, only under limited circumstances are
consumers actually made worse off. In other cases consumers are unhurt by
tying (Weinberg [1996]). Regardless, current statutes make tying by banking
companies illegal.5
Proliferation of Monopoly
Some observers argue that, in addition to conﬂicts of interest, preventing the
exercise of monopoly power is another reason for the banking/commerce sep-
aration. The legislative history of the Bank Holding Company Act makes
it clear that Congress intended the Act to guard against the proliferation of
5 See Weinberg (1996) for a review of bank anti-tying statutes and the economics of tying.
See Krainer (2000, 22) for a discussion of banks denying credit to their commercial afﬁliates’
competitors. In 1997 the U.S. General Accounting Ofﬁce analyzed banks for evidence of tying
bank loans to securities activities. It found little evidence of any such tying (U.S. GAO [1997]).14 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
monopoly. For example, the Senate Banking Committee report on the con-
ference bill notes that the Act was to provide “safeguards...against undue
concentration of control of banking activities. The dangers accompanying
monopoly in this ﬁeld are particularly undesirable in view of the signiﬁcant
part played by banking in our present national economy” (U.S. Code: Con-
gressional and Administrative News [1956, 2482–83]). Because such lan-
guage is vague, it is difﬁcult to determine whether the undue concentration
discussed refers to horizontal or conglomerate concentration. As a result, it
is uncertain whether proliferation of monopoly was behind the Bank Hold-
ingCompanyAct’sbanking/commercerestrictions. Horizontalconcentration
means combining a number of banks under one bank holding company such
thatthisholdingcompanycontrolsahighpercentageofbanks. Conglomerate
concentration means combining both banks and nonbanks under one holding
company so that one conglomerate controls a signiﬁcant percentage of busi-
ness ﬁrms in banking and a nonbanking industry, or in several nonbanking
industries.
Observers since have argued that Congress was indeed concerned with
conglomerate concentration. A case in point was a 1974 Federal Reserve’s
denial,undertheBankHoldingCompanyAct,ofanapplicationbyBankAmer-
ica Corporation to form an overseas joint venture with Allstate Insurance.
Here the Fed said that “close working relationships abroad between large
U.S. banking organizations and large U.S. insurance companies could in time
weave a matrix of relationships...that could lead to an undue concentration
of economic resources in the domestic and foreign commerce of the United
States...not...consistent with the purposes of the Bank Holding Company
Act.”6
Frequently, when advocating the separation of banks from nonbanks on
the basis of monopoly, proponents have argued that the combination would
allow the monopoly power that banks hold in their product markets to be used
by combined ﬁrms to raise prices in other areas.7 But as discussed earlier,
whilein1956concernsaboutmonopolymayhavemotivatedCongress,during
the1970sand1980scompetitionexpandedgreatly,amongbanksandbetween
banks and nonbanks. Expanded competition signiﬁcantly reduced any oppor-
tunity banks might have had to exercise monopoly power in banking services
andtoexpandittootherbusinesseswithwhichtheymightcombine. Congress
seems to have been cognizant of these changes. When Congress passed the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in 1999, it allowed combinations of large banks
with large insurance and large securities ﬁrms. These were exactly the types
6 Board of Governors (1974, 519) (italics added for emphasis). For a similar argument on
another application, see Board of Governors (1981, 451), as cited in Halpert (1988).
7 Halpert (1988, 500–505) discusses the argument that banking monopoly might proliferate
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of combinations—that is, large banks with large nonbanks—denied earlier
by regulators based on undue concentration language in the Bank Holding
CompanyAct.
Safety Net Concerns
For the reasons discussed above, conﬂicts of interest and fears of expanding
monopoly power alone are probably insufﬁcient reasons to maintain the cur-
rent wall separating banking and commerce and deny ﬁrms the opportunity
to beneﬁt from combinations. Nevertheless, there is another set of hazards
that could justify the continued presence of the wall separating banking and
commerce or at least require that signiﬁcant precautions be taken if the wall
is removed. The hazards come in three forms, discussed in the following
paragraphs, and each involves an increased chance of bank failures and a
subsequent bailout ﬁnanced by taxpayers. If bailouts occur, the government
safety net, meant to protect bank depositors, could be extended to creditors
of commercial companies. If extended, too many resources might ﬂow to
bank-afﬁliated commercial companies, and economic efﬁciency would be di-
minished. The threat to the safety net could arise because (1) losses might
be shifted to banks to protect a combined ﬁrm’s reputation with investors, (2)
losses might be shifted to banks to take advantage of shareholder limited lia-
bility, and (3) the combined ﬁrm’s riskiest assets might be shifted to the bank.
Of the three hazards, the ﬁrst two could justify continued banking/commerce
separation. The third cannot justify separation but is discussed below because
it is often mentioned as a hazard of bank/nonbank afﬁliations.
Loss Shifts that Protect Reputation
If banking/commerce combinations are allowed, a combined company can
be expected under certain circumstances to withdraw resources from its bank
to hide problems in its commercial subsidiary, damaging bank safety. The
holding company is likely to choose this course when it can hide commercial
subsidiary losses from investors and analysts by shifting commercial sub-
sidiary losses to the bank. The holding company would beneﬁt by hiding
the loss, which if revealed would likely be perceived as negative information
about the ability of the ﬁrm’s management and the riskiness of its operations;
that is, it would damage the ﬁrm’s reputation. Such negative information
would lead creditors to demand higher interest rates, lowering future proﬁts.
Yet, as discussed presently, while shifts to hide losses can be detrimental to
banks, they can just as easily be beneﬁcial: holding companies could choose
to shift bank losses to commercial subsidiaries. Consequently, a concern that
bank holding companies might engage in loss shifts is no reason to prohibit
banking/commerce combinations. Instead, if one is to argue that the danger16 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
of shifts can justify the banking/commerce wall, one must believe that loss
shifts are more likely to ﬂow toward bank than commercial subsidiaries.
Reputation-protecting shifts that can work to the detriment of bank health
are likely to occur when two conditions are met. First, the commercial sub-
sidiary suffers a loss large enough to create its insolvency. Second, the loss, if
shifted to the bank subsidiary, would avert the bank’s insolvency. The second
conditionwouldgenerallybemetifthebank’snetworthisconsiderablylarger
thanthatofthecommercialsubsidiary(beforeandaftertheshift). Underthese
conditions, a shift of a commercial subsidiary’s loss to the bank would protect
the holding company’s reputation. An insolvency is certain to draw nega-
tive outsider attention, since it will likely involve either debt renegotiation or
bankruptcy. In contrast, a mere loss or perhaps just an increase in the bank’s
reported expenses can be expected to draw far less attention. Even so, a loss
shift necessarily weakens the bank.
Even if the commercial subsidiary experiences a loss that does not lead
to its insolvency but is still signiﬁcant, such a loss could still shift to a larger
bank subsidiary. The bank holding company might choose to shift the loss
because it might be less noticeable on the books of a large ﬁrm than on those
of a smaller one. In addition, observers have traditionally argued that banks
mayhavemoreopaquebalancesheetsthandocommercialﬁrms,sothatlosses
can be better hidden in a bank subsidiary. Some recent research appears to
support this view of bank opacity.8 If banks are indeed more opaque, then
losses are more likely to go unnoticed if shifted to the bank.
Nevertheless, the existence of this incentive to shift losses in order to hide
them does not imply that commercial and banking ﬁrms should be kept sepa-
rate. Under one set of circumstances already discussed—when the bank’s net
worth(meaningitscapital)islargerthanthecommercialsubsidiary’s—abank
holding company can hide the loss by shifting it to the bank. However, un-
deranequallylikelysetofcircumstances—whenthecommercialsubsidiary’s
capital exceeds the bank’s capital—there is no beneﬁt from shifting commer-
cial subsidiary losses to the bank. Instead, if the bank produces losses, the
bankholdingcompanycanbeneﬁtbyshiftingbanklossesintothecommercial
ﬁrm. Therefore, prohibiting banking/commercial afﬁliations will not neces-
sarily improve bank safety or protect taxpayers and the FDIC from losses.
Further, creditors of banks as well as commercial ﬁrms afﬁliated with
banks are likely to be well aware of the incentive to shift losses in order to
8 Morgan (2000) ﬁnds that banks and insurance companies are inherently more opaque than
other ﬁrms. Morgan checks for opaqueness of banks and insurance ﬁrms versus nonﬁnancial ﬁrms
by measuring the frequency of disagreements between the two major ratings agencies in their
ratings of banks, insurance companies, and other ﬁrms. He ﬁnds that the two agencies disagree
more frequently over banks (and over insurance companies) than over commercial ﬁrms. Morgan
contends that the cause of the disagreement is the difﬁculty of evaluating opaque bank balance
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hide them. By charging higher interest rates, both types of creditors will
penalize afﬁliations that might shift losses to the detriment of their debtor
(either commercial ﬁrm or bank). For example, a bank’s creditors would
be likely to view a combination with a risky commercial ﬁrm—that is, one
that might produce shiftable losses—as dangerous. They would demand the
bank pay an increased interest rate if such an afﬁliation were undertaken.
Moreover, if the afﬁliated commercial ﬁrm’s riskiness increased, the bank’s
creditorswouldimposeanadditionalriskpremiumtoaccountfortheincreased
risk of a loss shift. If the risk became large, the increased premium might be
sufﬁcient to cause the holding company to divest either the commercial ﬁrm
or the bank. The afﬁliated commercial ﬁrm’s creditors would do the same.
Yet there is reason to think that shifts would tend more frequently to de-
pletebankresourcesratherthancommercialﬁrmresources. Whilecreditorsof
commercialsubsidiariesofbankholdingcompanieswoulddemandhigherrisk
premia for afﬁliations likely to produce losses that can be shifted to the com-
mercial afﬁliate, bank creditors have a reduced incentive to do so. Many of a
bank’screditors—thoseholdinginsureddepositsinthebank—woulddemand
no additional compensation when the bank afﬁliates with a risky commercial
ﬁrm. If losses are shifted to the bank, weakening it, its government-insured
deposits are no less likely to be repaid. Therefore, while the creditors of com-
mercial afﬁliates penalize risky combinations, those of banks do not. Con-
sequently, combinations that could lead to loss shifts toward banks are likely
to be more common than combinations that could produce loss shifts toward
commercial ﬁrms.
Note that if bank deposit insurance premia were closely tied to individual
bank riskiness and accounted for the risk of loss shifts, higher premia would
discourage afﬁliations that could be risky to banks. As discussed in more
detail below, observers typically argue that deposit insurance premia are not
closely tied to bank risk.
Loss Shifts that Take Advantage of Limited Liability
While the previous section discusses a set of incentives that could lead a
bank holding company to shift losses from a less capitalized subsidiary to
a more capitalized one, another set of incentives can produce the opposite
result. Undercertaincircumstances,byshiftinglossesfromamorecapitalized
subsidiary to a less capitalized one, the bank holding company can reduce
losses. The strategy, discussed below, is beneﬁcial because of the protections
offered shareholders by the principle of limited liability. In some cases it
could work to the detriment of the FDIC, and ultimately, to the detriment
of taxpayers. As in the case of reputation-protecting shifts, shifts that take
advantage of limited liability seem at ﬁrst to be just as likely to enhance
bank safety as diminish it, suggesting that this argument cannot be used as a
justiﬁcation for maintaining the separation between banking and commerce.18 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Onfurtheranalysis, however, itisclearthatlimitedliabilityshiftswouldmore
likelyworktothedetrimentofbanksandthereforetothedetrimentoftheFDIC
and taxpayers. Therefore, maintaining the banking/commerce wall might be
justiﬁed as a means of preventing these shifts.
The following example shows that with limited liability, a bank holding
company can avoid losses if it shifts them. Suppose a holding company—
Alpha Conglomerate Inc.—owns two subsidiaries, Bravo Dry Cleaners and
Echo National Bank. Bravo has a net worth of $100 million, while Echo’s
net worth is $5 million. Alpha’s only assets are its investments in the stock
of Bravo and Echo, and it is the sole owner of both. Consequently, Alpha’s
net worth is $105 million, the sum of Bravo’s and Echo’s net worth. If Bravo
suffers a $10 million loss (say it has bankrupt commercial customers to which
it has made $10 million in loans), Bravo’s net worth falls to $90 million. Also
as a consequence of Bravo’s loss, Alpha’s stockholders suffer a $10 million
loss since Alpha’s net worth falls to $95 million (the sum of Bravo’s $90
million net worth and Echo’s $5 million).
Suppose instead that Alpha could arrange to have Echo take the loss.
Echo could take the loss by purchasing the loans made to Bravo’s bankrupt
commercial customers for $10 million, even though the loans are worthless.9
The shift of the $10 million loss to Echo, which had only $5 million in net
worth before the shift, drives it into insolvency. Bravo has a net worth of $100
million after the shift, and Echo has a net worth of negative $5 million. Based
on the principle of limited liability of shareholders, however,Alpha can suffer
a loss of no more than its investment in Echo, or $5 million. The shift has
saved Alpha’s shareholders $5 million. In this case the FDIC, which insures
Echo, suffers the remaining $5 million loss. In summary, a holding company
can beneﬁt by shifting a loss when that loss is smaller than the loss-producing
subsidiary’s capital, but greater than the other subsidiary’s capital.
Alpha’s incentive to protect its reputation, as discussed in the previous
section,willtendtoworktopreventitfromemployingashiftthatwillproduce
an insolvency. Echo’s insolvency is certain to damage Alpha’s reputation
and raise its future borrowing costs. Further, such shifts could be illegal.
Nevertheless, when the beneﬁt from shifting losses is large, the shift might be
undertaken regardless of reputation or legality.
While this incentive to shift losses could endanger bank health, and in
fact such a shift led to a bank failure in 1953, holding companies owning
bank and commercial afﬁliates initially seem no more likely to shift losses
9As will be discussed presently, federal law restricts a bank’s ability to purchase loans made
by its afﬁliates to a small percentage of the bank’s net worth. Purchases of sufﬁcient afﬁliate
loans that lead to the bank’s insolvency would be illegal under the restrictions. Nevertheless, in
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into banks than away from them.10 In other words, combinations of banking
and commerce are just as likely to enhance bank safety as reduce it. However,
there is a greater chance that shifts will work against banks; for while banks’
major creditors—insured depositors—are largely indifferent about the risks
that afﬁliations with nonbanks might impose, commercial afﬁliates’creditors
are very interested. Creditors of commercial afﬁliates will penalize, with
demands of higher interest rates, afﬁliations that increase the likelihood of an
afﬁliate failure.
Sincecommercialﬁrmlossestendtobeshiftedtowardbanks,undermining
bank health, banking/commerce afﬁliations increase the likelihood of FDIC
payouts and ultimately of taxpayer bailouts of the FDIC. Consequently, a lim-
ited liability motive for loss shifts could provide a reason to favor prohibiting
banking/commerce combinations.
Beyond the cost to the FDIC and perhaps to taxpayers, who provide the
backstop for FDIC insurance, there is an additional cost of loss shifts (mo-
tivated by limited liability as well as reputation protection). If creditors of
bank-afﬁliatedcommercialﬁrmsbelievethattheseﬁrms’lossescanbeshifted
to banks and ultimately to the FDIC, then creditors will charge bank-afﬁliated
commercial ﬁrms lower interest rates than they would absent the perceived
abilitytoshift. Asaresultofthisreducedcostofcapital,afﬁliatedﬁrmswould
regard projects as viable that without this taxpayer-provided subsidy would
be unproﬁtable. In sum, too much investment capital would ﬂow to afﬁli-
ated ﬁrms, and the economy’s resources would be wasted.11 This potential
for resource waste may provide further reason to prohibit banking/commerce
combinations, or at least to regulate combined ﬁrms to discourage shifts.
Risk Shifts
At ﬁrst blush there appears to be one additional reason to maintain the separa-
tion between banking and commerce: combinations would allow risky assets
to be shifted from the commercial ﬁrm to the bank. Doing so increases the
bank’s riskiness, putting taxpayer funds at risk. This possibility has caused
some observers to raise concerns about afﬁliations between banks and non-
banks. As a justiﬁcation for maintaining the banking/commerce separation,
however, the argument is unconvincing.
To lower its total funding costs, a bank holding company with a commer-
cial subsidiary can shift the commercial ﬁrm’s riskiest assets to the bank. The
commercialﬁrmmustborrowusinguninsureddebt, whilethebankcangather
10 See Walter (1996, 22) for a discussion of the case in 1953 in which a bank failure resulted
from shifts from a bank holding company’s nonbank subsidiary to its bank subsidiary, apparently
motivated by an attempt to take advantage of limited liability.
11 See Walter and Weinberg (2002, 373–75) for a more complete discussion of the economic
costs of government subsidization of private ﬁrms’ borrowing costs.20 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
funds by issuing insured deposits. As a result, funding costs are lowered and
holding company proﬁts are increased when the commercial ﬁrm’s riskiest
assets are shifted to the bank. (Note that risk shifts differ from loss shifts,
discussed earlier. Loss shifts occur when the bank purchases the assets from
the commercial ﬁrm at a price that produces a loss for the bank. Risk shifts
occur when the bank pays a price that produces no loss for the bank, since it
is insensitive to risk.) For banks’costs to be less sensitive, deposit insurance
premia and other supervisor-imposed costs must be imperfectly sensitive to
bank riskiness. Observers argue that this could be the case for many banks.12
Risk shifts, however, do not justify the banking/commerce wall because
afﬁliation creates no more incentive to shift risks than would exist without
afﬁliation. If the penalty for holding risky assets is lower for banks than for
commercialﬁrms(or,forthatmatter,foranyuninsuredﬁrm),thenriskyassets
would ﬂow into banks even if they have no afﬁliates. Banks would be willing
to pay more for risky assets than would other ﬁrms and would bid them away
from others.
For example, imagine that a commercial ﬁrm, Juliet Tool and Die, Inc., is
currently paying its creditors 15 percent in annual interest payments to raise
$100,000. It uses this $100,000 to make trade credit (i.e., a loan from a seller
to its customer used by the customer to purchase the seller’s goods) available
to its customer, Kilo Millwork. Juliet’s creditors charge this high rate because
they view Kilo as risky, such that Juliet’s loan to Kilo heightens the chance
that Juliet will itself fail; in other words, the trade credit is a risky asset.
Alternatively, Lima National Bank, which pays depositors only 10 percent,
can raise the $100,000 from depositors with which it can provide funds to
Kilo. Because of FDIC insurance, its depositors care little about the riskiness
of Lima’s assets. In such a case, Lima National can be expected to approach
Julietandoffertobuyitsasset, thetradecredittoKilo. Limawouldbewilling
to pay more than the asset is worth to Juliet since Lima can fund the asset less
expensively than can Juliet.13
A holding company with a bank subsidiary and a commercial subsidiary
may well beneﬁt from having its commercial ﬁrm sell its risky assets to the
bank subsidiary because of underpriced deposit insurance. But a commercial
ﬁrmwithnoafﬁliatedbankwouldﬁndthatbankswouldwanttobuytheirrisky
assets just as well. So, if deposit insurance is underpriced, whereby it is less
expensive for banks than for commercial ﬁrms to hold risky assets, preventing
afﬁliation would not prevent risky assets from being shifted to banks.
12 See Walter (1998, 2–9) for a discussion of the means by which banks can receive risk-
insensitive funding.
13 Lima would only be willing to pay more for the loan than it is worth to Juliet if Lima’s
deposit insurance premia do not completely account for the risk the loan adds. Still, as already
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3. PROTECTIONS NEEDED IF THE WALL COMES DOWN
The previous section describes the hazard from corporate combinations be-
tween banks and commercial ﬁrms, and argues that the pertinent hazards arise
from (1) loss shifts to protect bank holding company reputation, that is, shifts
meant to hide the loss; and (2) loss shifts that take advantage of limited lia-
bility, allowing shareholders to avoid the loss by imposing them instead on
creditorsorontheFDIC.Ineithercase,economicefﬁciencycanbediminished
and the loss can end up with taxpayers. One means of addressing the hazards
is to prohibit banking/commerce combinations; in other words, maintain the
legislative status quo. Alternatively, legislators may decide that the beneﬁts
of combinations are worth bearing some danger of loss shifts. If legislators
took this latter view, what types of protections could they employ to reduce
the frequency of loss shifts into banks and thereby possibly to the FDIC or
taxpayers? Already in place are the ﬁrewalls established by Sections 23A and
23B of the Federal ReserveAct. These statutory provisions limit transactions
between banks and their afﬁliates. The ﬁrewalls are enforced by regular (once
every year or year and a half) supervisory examination and by the threat of
penalty if violations are discovered.
Beyond these current protections, which apply to any afﬁliations, includ-
inganycommercialafﬁliationsthatmightbeallowedinthefuture,supervisors
might wish to mimic the types of limitations uninsured creditors would im-
pose on risky afﬁliations. As noted earlier, one can expect uninsured creditors
to penalize the ﬁrm they fund (their debtor) and thereby potentially prevent
an afﬁliation that would tend to lend itself to loss shifts. If supervisors are
to mimic creditors’ actions, they will restrict the types of ﬁrms that banks
can afﬁliate with to those least likely to produce loss shifts in the ﬁrst place.
In other words, supervisors would only allow banks to afﬁliate with healthy
commercial ﬁrms possessing strong capital at the time of afﬁliation.
While at the time of acquisition a new commercial afﬁliate may be strong,
its health could deteriorate or it could take on undue risks. If uninsured
creditors ﬁnd that their debtor’s afﬁliates are suffering losses or assuming
risky endeavors, thereby increasing the chance of losses that might be shifted
to their debtor, they would demand higher interest payments to compensate
for their added risk. So creditors can be expected to monitor carefully the
healthoftheirdebtor’safﬁliates. TheFederalReservemimicsprivatecreditors
by performing such monitoring (called umbrella supervision by the Fed) of
holding companies owning a bank and a securities or insurance company,
underprovisionsspeciﬁedintheGramm-Leach-BlileyActof1999. Umbrella
oversight might well be desirable for combinations of banks with commercial
ﬁrms,butcouldbemoredifﬁcultthanumbrellaoversightofﬁnancialﬁrms,for
reasons discussed presently. If monitoring reveals that the bank’s commercial
afﬁliate has increased its risk, supervisors could impose a monetary cost on
the bank through the current mechanism by which insurance premia are set.22 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Because umbrella oversight of commercial ﬁrms may be more difﬁcult
than oversight of ﬁnancial ﬁrms, any legislation that might remove the wall
could add additional protections beyond those found in the Gramm-Leach-
BlileyAct. For example, such legislation could also limit the size of commer-
cial afﬁliates to those no larger than a fraction of the size of the bank. Such
a limit could be beneﬁcial because as noted in an earlier section, shifts large
enough to sink the bank are most likely to derive from commercial afﬁliates
that are large relative to the size of the bank afﬁliate.
Firewalls
The 23A and 23B ﬁrewalls are intended to stop exactly those loss shifts that
presenthazardsforbank/commercialﬁrmafﬁliations. Yettherehavebeensev-
eral cases in which shifts have caused bank failures, regardless of ﬁrewalls.
Additionally, the ﬁrewalls have not been tested in a period of widespread afﬁl-
iations involving nonbanks large enough to produce dangerous losses. Con-
sequently, while in principle ﬁrewalls should prevent loss shifts, supervisors
will probably wish to take further protective steps if the banking/commerce
wall is removed.
Since 1933, banks have been protected against shifts of losses from afﬁli-
ates by ﬁrewalls. Firewalls are found in Sections 23A and 23B of the Federal
ReserveAct and apply to all banks.14 They limit and place controls on trans-
actions between banks and their afﬁliates.15 For example, the 23A ﬁrewalls
limit transactions, such as loans and asset purchases, between a bank and any
individual afﬁliate to 10 percent of the bank’s capital, and with all of its afﬁl-
iates in total to 20 percent of the bank’s capital. The ﬁrewalls operate only in
one direction—they prevent transactions that might shift afﬁliate losses to the
bank, but do not prevent transactions that might shift bank losses to afﬁliates.
For instance, the ﬁrewalls prohibit loans to afﬁliates beyond 10 percent of
bank capital, but not the reverse—loans to the bank by afﬁliates. They also
require that purchases of afﬁliate assets by the bank be on terms at least as
favorable to the bank as market terms. In contrast, the nonbank afﬁliate can
purchase assets from the bank on terms unfavorable to the afﬁliate. Penalties
for ﬁrewall violations can be quite severe, extending to signiﬁcant monetary
penalties imposed on banks and their managers and directors.
Bank failures caused by the shifts that ﬁrewalls were designed to prevent
havebeeninfrequent,buttherewereatleasttwo,oneofwhichwasquitelarge.
The 1955 Senate Report on the Bank Holding Company Act noted that “no
widespread abuse of this nature [loss shifts] has been brought to the attention
14 More speciﬁcally, Sections 23A and 23B apply to all insured banks and savings institutions.
They are found at 12 U.S.C. 371c and 12 U.S.C. 371c-1, respectively.
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of [Congress]” (U.S. Code: Congressional and Administrative News [1956,
2486]). TheHouseReportontheActdiddiscussonecase,thatofthe1953fail-
ure of First State Bank of Elmwood Park, Illinois, which resulted from shifts
ofbadloansfromanonbankloancompanytoitsafﬁliatebank—apparentlyto
take advantage of limited liability protections (U.S. House [1955, 18–19]).16
Similarly,a1983studyofthecausesofbankfailuresfortheprevioustenyears
foundonlyonecaseoutof120failurescausedbytransactionsbetweenabank
and its nonbank afﬁliates. Still, this case, the failure of Chattanooga-based,
$461 million Hamilton National Bank in 1976, was the third largest in U.S.
history up to that time (Walter [1996, 23]).
Historically, then, ﬁrewalls have proven less than perfectly impervious.
Further, until recently, afﬁliations were quite limited, offering few opportuni-
ties to put the ﬁrewalls to the test. Bank holding companies were, for the most
part,restrictedtoowningnonbankﬁnancialﬁrmsthatconductedactivitiesthat
were similar to banking. Until the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act was enacted in
1999,bankingcompanieswereprohibitedfrombroadsecuritiesandinsurance
powers. Because of the limitations on the types of nonbank ﬁrms that bank
holding companies could own, nonbanks have typically been much smaller
than their bank afﬁliates. Since they were smaller, they were unlikely to be
capable of producing losses large enough to sink afﬁliated banks.
Due Diligence prior toAfﬁliation
Since the effectiveness of ﬁrewalls is uncertain, care must be taken to en-
sure that bank holding companies do not acquire especially risky nonbanks.
Currently, supervisors evaluate the nonbank’s ﬁnancial health as part of their
review of applications from bank holding companies to acquire nonbanks.17
They conduct analyses similar to due diligence analyses performed by invest-
ment companies for unregulated acquirers. Supervisors look for many of the
same signals of problems that a creditor would, such as excessive debt and
weak earnings performance. Similar analyses would be necessary for bank
holding company acquisitions of commercial ﬁrms, should the wall come
down.
Still, it might seem that such analysis of commercial ﬁrms would be ex-
pensive for bank supervisors, requiring the development of a very different
16 See FDIC (1953, 7–8) for details of the First State Bank case beyond those provided in
the House Report.
17 The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 allows ﬁnancial holding companies to dispense with
applying for supervisors’ approval of many nonbank acquisitions. Financial holding companies
simply notify supervisors of the acquisition, within 30 days of the acquisition (Spong [2000, 157]).
Therefore, acquisitions of nonbanks by ﬁnancial holding companies often do not involve a pre-
acquisition review of the nonbank’s ﬁnancial health. For acquisitions by bank holding companies
that have not chosen, under rules speciﬁed by Gramm-Leach-Bliley, to become ﬁnancial holding
companies, such reviews still occur.24 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
skill set. Bank supervisors who specialize in application review are experi-
enced in examining the health of ﬁnancial ﬁrms, not of commercial ﬁrms.
Yet other supervisory employees—those who review banks’loans for their re-
payment prospects—are practiced in analyzing commercial ﬁrms, since most
large bank loans go to such ﬁrms. Today’s bank examiners also engage in
industrywide analysis as part of their review of syndicated lending to large
commercial ﬁrms. Therefore, these skills might be brought to bear fairly
cheaply.
Under current procedures, if the supervisory review of the ﬁrm to be
acquired turns up potential risks, the supervisor can deny the application or
require that the risk be ameliorated. An application review of acquisitions of
commercial ﬁrms would likely include the same options.
Beyond these procedures, supervisors might add another requirement,
because analyses of commercial ﬁrms could be more difﬁcult than analyses
of ﬁnancial ﬁrms. Shifts of losses large enough to sink the bank and take
advantage of limited liability are most likely to occur when the commercial
ﬁrm is large relative to its bank afﬁliate. Consequently, supervisors might
also limit the size of commercial ﬁrms acquired to a fraction of the size of
afﬁliated banks. Doing so would reduce the chance of bank-sinking or bank-
endangering loss shifts. Such a requirement is not unprecedented, as relative
size limits were imposed on bank holding company merchant-banking acqui-
sitions under provisions of Gramm-Leach-Bliley.
Umbrella Supervision
While careful analysis of potential afﬁliates might prevent bank holding com-
paniesfrompurchasingtroubledorinitiallyriskycommercialﬁrms, problems
at a commercial ﬁrm could arise well after its acquisition. Because of concern
for this possibility, supervisors may wish to maintain ongoing oversight of the
health of banks’ commercial afﬁliates. The aim of such oversight is to de-
termine whether the commercial afﬁliate has suffered losses or is expanding
its riskiness. If supervisors ﬁnd losses or heightened riskiness of commer-
cial afﬁliates, they could indirectly impose a monetary penalty on the bank
by lowering its supervisory rating. All banks are graded by supervisors on
their ﬁnancial health, riskiness, and management expertise. When a bank’s
grade (supervisory rating) declines, its insurance premiums can rise. Beyond
this monetary penalty, when commercial afﬁliates suffer losses or increases in
riskiness, supervisorsmightalsowatchmorecarefullyforlossshifts(i.e., ﬁre-
wall violations). Further, they might even prohibit all transactions between
the bank and its troubled commercial afﬁliate. In doing so, the supervisor
mimics the monitoring that bank creditors would be expected to perform in
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Oversight of this sort currently occurs under provisions of the Gramm-
Leach-BlileyAct, whichmaketheFedtheumbrellasupervisor ofallﬁnancial
holding companies. In this role, the Fed is to ensure that problems in a
securities or insurance afﬁliate do not endanger the bank. For information
on the health of securities and insurance afﬁliates, the Fed relies on ﬁnancial
reports from the Securities and Exchange Commission and state insurance
commissioners. In some cases the Fed will participate in examinations of
insurancecompaniesperformedbyinsurancecommissioners. Onemainpoint
of its umbrella oversight is to ensure that bank resources are not being shifted
to nonbank afﬁliates. In the extreme, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act gives the
Fed the authority to require that nonbank afﬁliates are divested. Divestiture
provides the ultimate prohibition on loss-shifting transactions.
Umbrella oversight of commercial ﬁrms may be more difﬁcult than over-
sight of securities and insurance ﬁrms. Securities and insurance ﬁrms already
face strict regulation by agencies with long-standing experience as supervi-
sors. Moreover, insurance companies receive regular examinations for ﬁnan-
cial health. Most commercial ﬁrms are less regulated and are not subject
to examination by governmental supervisors. Developing such processes for
commercial ﬁrms afﬁliated with banks could be quite expensive for an um-
brella supervisor of combined bank/commercial ﬁrms and could impose large
regulatory costs on the combined ﬁrms themselves.
Nevertheless, public ﬁrms—those whose securities trade in public
markets—must release a great deal of ﬁnancial information. Such infor-
mation could provide much of the data necessary to judge ﬁnancial health.
While publicly available information may be less accurate and complete than
that typically available to bank regulators, who have the power to require the
release of any additional information they may deem useful, it is the set of
information private investors rely upon when deciding whether to invest.18
Therefore, for unregulated commercial ﬁrms, umbrella supervisors could rely
upon publicly available information to a signiﬁcant extent. Additionally, in
passing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, enacted in July 2002, legislators attempted
to enhance the reliability of disclosures made by publicly traded companies.
4. CONCLUSION
Clearly, ﬁrms beneﬁt from combinations of commercial and ﬁnancial units,
since for years they have chosen to mix them. Yet many experts have main-
tained that banking and commerce should remain separate. Two predominant
reasons for maintaining the separation are concerns with conﬂicts of interest
and the proliferation of monopoly. The most credible reason—indeed, one
18 Of course, if private investors believe losses suffered by their bank-afﬁliated commercial
ﬁrms can be shifted, then they have less reason to demand accurate accounting information.26 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
that poses a signiﬁcant hazard from combining banking with commerce—is
that such afﬁliations could provide, at least under certain circumstances, in-
centives for loss shifts. While it turns out those circumstances are somewhat
limited, they are not inconsequential.
Loss shifts can impose costs on taxpayers and waste resources. If losses
areshiftedfromcommercialﬁrmstoafﬁliatedbanks,taxpayer-fundedbailouts
may result. If creditors become convinced that ﬁrms afﬁliated with banks
can shift losses to insured banks, then these ﬁrms will enjoy below-market
borrowing costs. Below-market funding means that too many resources will
ﬂowtobank-afﬁliatedﬁrms. Ifso,productivityandﬁnancialmarketefﬁciency
are diminished; in other words, scarce resources are wasted.
Nonetheless, since the Gramm-Leach-BlileyAct of 1999 allowed securi-
tiesandinsuranceﬁrmstoafﬁliatewithbanks, potentiallyproducingthesame
loss shifts that commercial afﬁliation might engender, why not also allow
commercial afﬁliations? One reason that legislators might prefer not to open
that door is that commercial ﬁrms are largely unregulated so the demands on
supervisory resources are likely greater when protecting against shifts from
largely unregulated commercial ﬁrms.
On the other hand, if legislators decide that the beneﬁts of banking/
commerce combinations could outweigh the hazards, what means of protec-
tion might they employ to minimize them? Several come to mind, including
(1) careful analysis of the ﬁnancial condition of commercial ﬁrms that bank
holding companies wish to acquire, prior to acquisition; (2) the maintenance
of ﬁrewalls to prevent loss shifts; and (3) umbrella supervision to provide the
means of reducing the hazard. In addition to these means, the requirement
that commercial ﬁrms be signiﬁcantly smaller than any banks they afﬁliate
with offers further protection. Size limits are likely to be valuable since a
commercial ﬁrm is unlikely to produce a loss large enough to threaten a much
larger bank afﬁliate.
APPENDIX: BACKGROUND ON THE STATUTES
FORMING THE WALL
National BankAct of 1864
The National Bank Act restricts the opportunities for national banks to un-
dertake commercial activities. National banks are those chartered and reg-
ulated by the U.S. Treasury Department’s Ofﬁce of the Comptroller of the
Currency. The Act states that “a national banking association shall...have
powerto...exercise...allsuchincidentalpowersasshallbenecessarytocarryJ. R. Walter: Banking and Commerce 27
on the business of banking; by discounting and negotiating promissory notes,
drafts, bills of exchange, and other evidences of debt; by receiving deposits;
by buying and selling exchange, coin, and bullion; by loaning money on per-
sonal security” (12 U.S.C. 24). While courts and the Comptroller have, over
theyears, wrangledoverthemeaningofthebusinessofbankingclause, courts
havegenerallytakenafairlyconservativeviewofactivitiesthatmightqualify.
As decided in an inﬂuential court ruling, for example, banks are generally
limited to conducting businesses that are functionally interchangeable with
traditional banking services (M&M Leasing Corp. v. Seattle First National
Bank, 563 F.2d 1377, 1383 [9th Cir. 1977] as cited by Halpert [1988, 487]).
In sum, under the Act courts have allowed national banks to engage in busi-
nesses similar to banking but not other commercial activities. This restriction
of powers extends not only to activities of banks, but to activities conducted
by subsidiaries owned by banks (Halpert [1988, 486]).19
State Laws and FDICIA
For state-chartered banks, the banking/commerce wall is constructed of a mix
of elements from state laws, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Im-
provementAct of 1991 (FDICIA), and the National BankAct. State banking
statutes typically set limits on the nonbank activities of state banks and their
subsidiaries similar to the limits on national banks (Spong [2000, 37–41]).
Over the years a number of states have authorized activities beyond those
allowed national banks. Yet state banks’ opportunity to expand further than
the activities allowed under the National Bank Act was largely ruled out by
the FDICIA. Speciﬁcally, Section 24 of the Federal Deposit InsuranceAct as
amended by the FDICIA prohibits insured state-chartered banks from engag-
ing in any activities impermissible for national banks unless the FDIC rules
that such activities pose no threat to the deposit insurance fund (sec. 303 of
Public Law 102-242).
Bank Holding CompanyAct
Enacted in May 1956, the Bank Holding Company Act was based on the
view that “bank holding companies ought to conﬁne their activities to the
managementandcontrolofbanks.” Legislatorsappeartohavebeenmotivated
by two concerns. First, that conﬂicts of interest might arise if one company
19 Halpert (1988, 497) argues that it was of minor signiﬁcance to Congress whether banks
engaged in nonbank activities when writing this language of the National Banking Act. He main-
tains that Congress “never afﬁrmatively required banks to stay out of nonbanking business,” but
“[r]ather, subsequent interpretations of the statute by comptrollers of the currency and various courts
provided its restrictive cast.”28 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
owned both a bank and a commercial ﬁrm. For example, such a conﬂict arises
whenabankreceivesarequestforaloanfromoneofitscommercialafﬁliate’s
competitors. Second, though the legislative history is less clear on this point,
legislators appear to have also been worried that combinations might lead to
the growth of monopoly power.
Toaddresstheseconcerns,theActrestrictedbankholdingcompaniessuch
that they “would no longer be authorized to manage and control nonbanking
assets unrelated to the banking business” (U.S. Code: Congressional and Ad-
ministrative News [1956, 2484, 2492]). At the time theAct was passed, bank-
ing companies were growing rapidly through mergers. In a few cases these
companiesincludednonbankingbusinesses. Thewidest-rangingexamplewas
found in Transamerica Corporation. It combined in one ﬁrm, banking, insur-
ance, and a relatively small amount (as a percentage of Transamerica’s total
assets) of metals manufacturing and ﬁsh processing (Halpert [1988, 498]).
The Act required that companies wishing to purchase a bank ﬁrst seek
approval from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Fur-
ther,theActprohibitedtheBoardfromapprovingpurchasesbycompaniesen-
gagedinactivitiesthatwerenotcloselyrelatedtobanking,therebyprohibiting
commercial companies such as manufacturers from purchasing banks. Com-
mercial ﬁrms like Transamerica that owned banks were given several years
in which to divest either the bank or alternatively their commercial activi-
ties. Through the next forty years the Board developed a list of activities
that would be considered closely related, excluding activities most observers
would consider commercial.
In 1999, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act was enacted. It added securi-
ties underwriting and dealing as well as insurance to the list of activities in
which banks—through bank-owned subsidiaries—and bank holding compa-
niescouldengage. Untilthattime,banksandtheirsubsidiariesandbankhold-
ing companies had been prohibited from the securities business by the 1933
Glass-Steagall Act.20 Insurance activities were likewise highly restricted be-
fore Gramm-Leach-Bliley by the Bank Holding CompanyAct and other laws.
The Glass-Steagall Act’s separation of securities activities from banking
was driven by legislators’concerns over conﬂicts of interest, excessive stock
marketspeculationbybank-ownedsecuritiesﬁrms,andthreatstothehealthof
banks from securities activities. Likewise the Bank Holding Company Act’s
separationofbankingandinsurancewaspartofthatlaw’sgeneralseparationof
banking from nonbank activities, driven by concerns over conﬂicts of interest
and monopoly power. By the time the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act was passed,
legislators and other observers had various reasons for removing the walls
that separated banks from securities and insurance activities. These reasons
20 Bank holding companies began to engage in limited securities activities starting in 1987
through a loophole in Glass-Steagall.J. R. Walter: Banking and Commerce 29
fall into three categories. First, there is little evidence of conﬂicts of interest
or other problems when banks were combined with nonbank ﬁrms. Second,
market developments, such as growing competition in banking markets, had
rendered these problems less important by the 1990s. Third, the concerns




panies. Further, the Act allows these new ﬁnancial holding companies to en-
gageinmerchantbanking, wherebyundercertainconditionsﬁnancialholding
companiesmaypurchasetheequityof(inotherwords,becomeownersof)any
type of corporation, commercial or otherwise. Financial holding companies’
merchant banking subsidiaries are restricted to holding the equity of ﬁrms
for a limited period of time and are prohibited from active management of
the ﬁrms. Beyond securities and insurance, Gramm-Leach-Bliley allows the
Board of Governors, in conjunction with theTreasury Department, to also au-
thorize ﬁnancial holding companies to undertake additional activities that are
“ﬁnancial in nature” or “incidental to ﬁnancial activities.” It also authorizes
the Board to approve activities that are “complementary to a ﬁnancial activ-
ity.” So the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act expands the activities of bank-owning
companies beyond those previously allowed by the Bank Holding Company
Act to include most ﬁnancial activities, but leaves in place the wall between
banking and commerce.
Loopholes in the Bank Holding Company Act Section
of theWall
Loopholes have been employed to allow banking/commerce combinations, at
least to a limited extent. The unitary thrift loophole, closed by the Gramm-
Leach-BlileyActin1999,wasonesuchopening. Throughit,companiesown-
ing only one thrift (thus the phrase unitary thrift) could also own commercial
ﬁrms. The loophole existed because thrift institutions (meaning primarily
savings and loans, and savings banks) are not covered by the Bank Hold-
ing Company Act, which prevents banking/commerce ties. Instead, thrifts
are regulated under the Savings and Loan Holding Company Amendments
of 1967, which allow commercial activities in unitary thrift holding compa-
nies (Seidman [1998, 7]). Gramm-Leach-Bliley closed the loophole though
it grandfathered existing unitary thrift holding companies, allowing them to
continue to engage in commercial activities.
Anadditionalloopholewaspartiallyclosedin1987, butremainsopentoa
limited degree. Before 1987, the Bank Holding CompanyAct deﬁned a bank
as a ﬁrm that both offered demand deposits (a type of checking account) and
made commercial loans. This deﬁnition prevented commercial ﬁrms from
owning a typical bank, which offers both demand deposits and commercial30 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
loans. Nevertheless, commercial ﬁrms could form a bank that did not offer
one or the other. By doing so, commercial ﬁrms could own banks that did
not fall within the Bank Holding CompanyAct deﬁnition of a bank and could
circumvent the Act’s prohibition of mixing banking and commerce. These
banks, known as nonbank banks, did not ﬁt the Act’s deﬁnition of a bank
but did offer most banking services. A number of ﬁrms established nonbank
banks, both as a means of combining banking and commerce and as a means
of banking across state lines, which was difﬁcult until the 1990s. In 1987,
Congress closed the loophole by tightening the deﬁnition, but allowed states
with existing laws authorizing the chartering of industrial loan corporations
(a type of nonbank bank that funds itself with insured deposits but does not
offer demand deposits) to continue to charter these ILCs. Several states had
such laws as of 1987. This option remains in force as a means of combining
banking and commerce in these states.
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